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Abstract
The literature notes an increasing trend towards labor market stratification and dual-
ization in coordinated market economies such as Germany. Labor market insiders and 
insider-oriented cross-class coalitions are usually identified as the driving forces behind 
these developments. This paper adds to this perspective by identifying different varieties 
of cross-class coalitions. On the basis of three case studies from the field of vocational 
training policy in Germany, two kinds of coalitions are identified: a conservative cross-
class coalition of unions and employers that is against state intrusion into the domain 
of firm-based training, and a segmentalist cross-class coalition of social democratic 
government actors and business that is promoting an incremental flexibilization of the 
system against union opposition. In an alternating manner, both coalitions block the 
large-scale change that would be the most effective in countering dualization. Hence, 
they tacitly support dualization by drift.
Zusammenfassung
Die einschlägige Literatur befindet, dass in koordinierten Marktwirtschaften wie zum 
Beispiel Deutschland die Stratifizierung und Dualisierung von Arbeitsmärkten zu-
nimmt. Als Triebkräfte hinter diesen Prozessen werden häufig Arbeitsmarkt-„Insider“ 
und auf die Interessen dieser Insider hin orientierte klassenübergreifende Koalitionen 
aus Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern identifiziert. Dieses Papier entwickelt eine neue 
Perspektive auf diesen Zusammenhang, indem es zeigt, dass es unterschiedliche Vari-
ationen von klassenübergreifenden Koalitionen gibt. Auf der Grundlage von drei Fall-
studien aus der deutschen Berufsbildungspolitik werden zwei Koalitionstypen identifi-
ziert: (1) eine konservative Koalition aus Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften, die gegen 
das Eindringen des Staates und für die Bewahrung der Eigenständigkeit der betriebli-
chen Ausbildung eintritt; (2) eine segmentalistische Koalition aus Teilen der Arbeitge-
berschaft und sozialdemokratischen Regierungsmitgliedern, die gegen den Widerstand 
der Gewerkschaften eine inkrementelle Flexibilisierung und Modernisierung des Sys-
tems betreibt. In wechselseitiger Weise verhindern beide Koalitionen die Durchsetzung 
großer Systemänderungen, obwohl diese am effektivsten wären, um dem Trend zur Du-
alisierung entgegenzuwirken.
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Varieties of Cross-Class Coalitions in the Politics of Dualization: 
Insights from the Case of Vocational Training in Germany
1 Introduction: Motivation and research question
The German vocational training system has long been regarded as a successful model 
(Culpepper 1999; Crouch et al. 1999; Finegold/Soskice 1988; Green 2001). The strong 
involvement of employers in initial vocational education and training, usually in the 
form of workplace-based apprenticeships and embedded in a supportive institution-
al infrastructure of associations and public policies, promotes smooth transitions for 
youth from training to work and low levels of youth unemployment (Allmendinger 
1989; Gangl 2003). Employers are additionally involved in the process of reforming 
and updating commonly accepted vocational certificates (Ausbildungsordnungen) in 
cooperation with unions and state actors, ensuring a tight fit between employers’ skill 
demands and the content of training and thus enabling firms to excel in strategies of 
“diversified quality production” (Streeck 1992), as documented by the competitiveness 
of the German export economy in high-quality manufacturing and chemicals.
In recent years, however, the German vocational training system has come under pres-
sure (Busemeyer 2009; Culpepper/Thelen 2008; Thelen 2007). For example, critics point 
to the difficulty of adapting a training system rooted in manufacturing to the needs of a 
service and knowledge economy (Anderson/Hassel 2007; Culpepper/Thelen 2008), the 
rising costs of training associated with increases in apprenticeship pay (Wagner 1999) 
and how workplace-based training systems such as the German one can discriminate 
on the basis of gender and/or migrant status (Estévez-Abe 2006, 2011). These criticisms 
do highlight certain weaknesses of the German training system, though some seem 
more relevant than others (see Busemeyer 2009: 62–77 for a more detailed discussion). 
With regard to the motivation for the research question addressed in this paper, the 
most important development in recent years has been a persistent lack of training slots 
and, as a consequence, the rise of the so-called “transition system” (Baethge et al. 2007).
The number of youths in need of an apprenticeship (commonly referred to as the “de-
mand”) first began to outstrip the number of training slots offered by firms (the “sup-
ply”) in the 1980s, and this has intensified over the years. Figure 1 presents data on the 
percentage of young people pursuing various alternative educational pathways (1992 
until 2008). The line at the top displays the percentage of young people who take up an 
apprenticeship in the dual system after leaving secondary school. The data show that 
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this educational pathway is still the most important for the majority of young people in 
Germany, although the percentage of entries into university is increasing (second line 
from bottom). The dominance of workplace-based training is also evident if we look at 
the percentage of entries into full-time, school-based vocational education (fourth line 
from the top in Figure 1), which is slightly increasing as well, but starts from a much low-
er base. In contrast to the other educational pathways, the number of entries into dual 
apprenticeship training is declining, which corresponds to a decreasing share of firms 
willing to offer training slots (Busemeyer 2009: 41, 44; Thelen/Busemeyer 2008: 10–11).
The most dramatic effect of this development is the strong increase in the number of 
entries into the so-called “transition system” (second line from top in Figure 1). The 
ostensible purpose of this system is to compensate for temporary shortfalls in the mar-
ket for apprenticeship training and to ease the transition from school to vocational 
training. Contrary to what the name suggests, however, the transition system is not a 
well-planned system, but a complex arrangement of more or less coordinated training 
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and qualification instruments (Baethge et al. 2007), whose only commonality is that 
they do not lead to certified vocational qualifications. According to surveys among ap-
prenticeship applicants, most young people would clearly have preferred to have started 
an apprenticeship directly after leaving school rather than to have been pushed into 
the “waiting loops” or “holding patterns” of the transition system (Beicht 2009; see also 
Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008; Solga 2005). Hence the primary pur-
pose of the “transition system” is not necessarily to ameliorate individual educational 
deficits, but to defuse the pressure on the apprenticeship system by channeling some 
of the excess demand into secondary labor markets. This process can be understood as 
dualization of vocational training.
When the Social Democrats came into power in 1998, a reasonable expectation was that 
the problem of a structural lack of training slots would be addressed more forcefully 
than it had been when the Christian Democrats were in power. As Figure 1 documents, 
the problem pressure had been building over the course of the 1990s. Also, employers’ 
associations had lost a significant share of their membership after German reunifica-
tion, in particular among smaller firms in East Germany (Silvia/Schröder 2007). With 
business power in decline, problem pressure mounting, and Social Democrats in charge, 
there was an expectation that major reforms in vocational training were imminent.
As will be shown in greater detail in the case studies below, while the government coali-
tion of the Social Democrats and the Greens did indeed pave the way for a major trans-
formation of the German vocational training system, this process did not necessarily 
go along with a major reform of the underlying legal framework, but often developed 
“below the radar of national legislative politics” (Culpepper 2007: 613). Most impor-
tantly, the “transition system” continued to expand during the reign of the SPD–Green 
coalition. Here the rise of the “transition system” resonates very well with recent work 
on the “dualization” of coordinated market economies (Eichhorst/Marx 2010; Iversen 
2005; King/Rueda 2008; Palier/Thelen 2010), which documents the asymmetrical im-
pact of labor market and welfare state reforms in countries such as Germany and France. 
In this literature, “cross-class coalitions” (Palier/Thelen 2010: 120) between (elements 
of) business and labor play an important role, because in resisting the ubiquitous pres-
sure of liberalization, they privilege the interests of labor market insiders over those of 
outsiders and thus – more or less inadvertently – promote the concentration of adjust-
ment costs onto outsiders, i.e., dualization.
This paper addresses two gaps in the fledgling literature on dualization: first, as Da-
vidsson and Nazcyk (2009: 32) note in their comprehensive review of the dualization 
literature: “What is missing in the literature that seeks to explain dualisation by political 
factors are empirical qualitative analyses of the politics of dualisation.” This paper helps 
to fill this gap, at least partly, by providing an in-depth case study of the crucial case of 
Germany, and in doing so develops new theoretical insights that should help to make 
sense of the politics of dualization in other countries as well. Second, the literature is 
quite divided on the role of government parties in the politics of dualization, especially 
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social democratic parties. Rueda (2006, 2007) argues that social democratic parties in 
government actively promote the interests of “insiders” and, as a consequence, dualiza-
tion. Palier and Thelen (2010: 121), however, seem to regard social democratic parties 
as important counterweights to the inward-oriented policies of cross-class coalitions 
between employers and unions in the labor market sphere. This paper shows that both 
perspectives may in fact be appropriate to some extent, because we observe different 
“varieties of cross-class coalitions.”
Against this background, the core research question of this paper is to identify the po-
litical driving forces and coalitions behind the recent and ongoing transformation of 
the German vocational training regime. How did policy-makers react to the increasing 
problem pressure, and what was the role of economic actors in shaping these reactions? 
As will be explained in detail in the next section, the German vocational training system 
can be regarded as a “crucial case,” in the sense of Gerring (2007), that can help to assess 
the plausibility of different theoretical perspectives to be found in the literature. For the 
moment, it suffices to say that this paper seeks to investigate why a change in govern-
ment from a coalition led by the business-friendly Christian Democrats to a coalition 
of Social Democrats and Greens did not stop the rise of the transition system (see Fig-
ure 1). In answering this question, the paper makes four central claims.
First, although the policy field of vocational training is characterized by a high number 
of veto players, which makes large-scale policy change unlikely, government parties do 
play a crucial role by manipulating the politics of institutional change. Partisan govern-
ment actors set the policy agenda and decide which actors are to be granted access to 
decision-making and under what conditions.
Second, the politics of institutional change in German vocational training are charac-
terized by complex coalitional patterns. Building on and extending the insights from 
the dualization literature, I argue that there are two varieties of cross-class coalitions: 
One is a “conservative” coalition of (large) businesses and trade unions, defending the 
privilege of firm-based apprenticeship training against attempts to expand school-
based vocational education. The other is a “segmentalist” coalition of (large) business 
and (social democratic) government actors, pushing for the flexibilization of the voca-
tional training regime against the opposition of trade unions and small and medium-
sized firms in the crafts (Handwerk) sector. In line with Häusermann’s (2010) findings 
for the case of pension policies, the paper shows that the coalitional patterns are more 
complex than initially assumed.
Third, the common element between the various instances of reform and non-reform 
to be analyzed in detail below is that the associational representatives of large businesses 
are usually in the winning coalition (for a similar argument see Thelen/Busemeyer 2008, 
2011). The paper identifies a causal mechanism for this phenomenon that highlights 
how both unions and state actors depend on the continued participation of employers 
in a collective training system that is ultimately based on the voluntary participation of 
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employers. However, I hasten to add that the nature of this dependence is not neces-
sarily structural, but stems from the specific institutional setup of the German political 
economy, in which a weak, “semi-sovereign” central state (Katzenstein 1987) delegates 
significant public obligations, such as the training of young people, to corporatist ac-
tors in the form of “private interest governments” (Streeck/Schmitter 1985).
Fourth, the outcome of these processes is dualization by drift.1 No political actor would 
openly promote dualization. In fact, as the case study below will show, political ac-
tors very much disagree on what would be the most adequate measures to counter the 
trend towards dualization. Nevertheless, by blocking certain reform attempts such as 
the expansion of school-based vocational education, the dominant political coalitions 
implicitly condone dualization (Palier/Thelen 2010: 131).
The structure of this paper differs somewhat from conventional approaches. The pur-
pose of studying “crucial cases” is “to elucidate causal mechanisms” (Gerring 2007: 238) 
when the case material fits with theoretical predictions or, as in the case of this paper, 
to generate new theoretical hypotheses to be tested in a larger set of cases. Therefore, in 
the next section, I will provide a more detailed discussion on different theoretical ap-
proaches to studying processes of institutional change in contemporary political econo-
mies, which is necessary to justify the selection of German vocational training politics 
as a “crucial case” (Gerring 2007). Following that, three instances of reforms or reform 
attempts in German vocational training policy are analyzed. The subsequent section 
discusses the insights from the case studies and develops, in an exploratory manner, 
new theoretical arguments on the role of government parties and business actors in the 
politics of dualization. The final section offers a conclusion.
2 Conventional wisdom on the politics of institutional change 
in contemporary political economies
In the growing literature on policy and institutional change in contemporary political 
economies, two theoretical perspectives can be distinguished that provide concrete ex-
pectations with regard to the dominant patterns in the formation of politico-economic 
coalitions. Each perspective has different implications for the effects of changes in the 
balance of power between employers, unions, and the state: one is rooted in power 
resource theory, the other in the dualization and varieties of capitalism literature. In 
the following section, I will also explain why, on the basis of the perspective of these 
theories, studying the politics of institutional change in the German vocational training 
system can be regarded as “crucial” in the sense of the “most likely case” (Gerring 2007) 
and thus provide a very fruitful ground for testing competing hypotheses.
1 I thank Kathleen Thelen for pointing this out to me.
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In focusing on the role of politico-economic coalitions as driving agents of institutional 
and policy change, I largely follow recent work by Kathleen Thelen and associates (Hall/
Thelen 2009; Mahoney/Thelen 2010; Thelen 2004; Thelen/Busemeyer 2008, 2011). Ac-
cording to Thelen’s approach, institutional change (via legislative policy reform or be-
yond) is driven forward by coalitions between economic and state actors that often 
run counter to the conventional left–right cleavage. Extending Thelen’s coalitional ap-
proach, I pay more attention to the role of government parties and how their partisan 
preferences shape the strategies and positions of state actors.
The first and the older of the two perspectives mentioned above is power resource the-
ory (Bradley et al. 2003; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979), which regards institutions (and 
policies) as the outcomes of power struggles between capital and labor. The political 
power of the left is considered to be the decisive factor driving the expansion of welfare 
states and the “pacification” of capitalism in the form of corporatist institutions (Roth-
stein 1987). This political power strongly depends on the presence of a united working-
class movement, i.e., a strong alliance between trade unions and the social democratic 
parties as representative of the working class within parliaments (ibid.: 306). The de-
cline of traditionally supportive milieus in the working class has of course forced social 
democratic parties to appeal to new voting groups in the middle class (Kitschelt 1993), 
often putting strain on the traditional alliance between unions and leftist parties. Nev-
ertheless, the central tenet of new scholarship in the tradition of power resource theory 
remains that the joint effect of strong unions and leftist government on the provision of 
working-class-friendly policies, e.g., high levels of redistribution, is much stronger than 
the separate effects (Bradley et al. 2003: 226). The coalitional patterns that are expected 
to emerge here are therefore simply a coalition of the left representing the interests of 
the economically weak against a coalition of the right representing the interests of busi-
ness and the upper income classes.
If we apply this perspective to the politics of vocational training reform in Germany, 
we would expect to see a coalition of trade unions and leftist parties (Social Democrats 
and Greens) against a coalition of rightist parties (Christian Democrats and the liberal 
Free Democrats) and representatives of business. This kind of confrontational coali-
tional pattern was in fact observed in the 1970s, when the government led by the Social 
Democrats (at that time in coalition with the Free Democrats) pushed forward with an 
ambitious reform agenda that would have significantly extended the role of the state 
in the German vocational training regime. These reforms were thoroughly opposed by 
the opposition party, the Christian Democrats, in alliance with business representatives 
from both the crafts sector and large enterprises. The crucial issue in this conflict was 
the balance between the need to create a sufficient number of high-quality training slots 
on the one hand and the autonomy of firms in organizing the content and implementa-
tion of training ordinances on the other.
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According to power resource theory, then, the change in government in 1998 could be 
expected to have led to a reemergence of the old cleavages from the 1970s and to poten-
tially major reforms in the training system. The Social Democrats’ new coalition partner, 
the Greens, had far fewer qualms about putting pressure on businesses to increase the 
number of available training slots than the Liberals had in the 1970s, and the problem 
pressure in the mid-1990s was much higher than before. The situation in the late 1990s 
can thus be considered as a “most likely” case for major policy reforms, driven forward 
by a reform-minded coalition of unions and social democrats.
The second theoretical perspective emphasizes the importance of cross-class coalitions 
between unions and employers as stabilizing factors in coordinated market economies 
(passim in Cusack et al. 2007; Hall/Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). In contrast to power 
resource theory, this literature argues that the institutions of coordinated market econ-
omies provide concrete economic benefits for both labor and business, and are thus 
supported by actors on both sides. The issue of skill formation is very prominent in 
the varieties of capitalism school of thought. In fact, joint investments in (co-)specific 
human capital assets are identified as the foundation for the formation of cross-class 
coalitions (Cusack, Iversen and Soskice 2007). This perspective holds that employers 
agree to the institutionalization of certain safeguards in the form of employment and 
unemployment protection in order to convince workers to invest in the formation of 
vocational skills (Estévez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice 2001).
However, cross-class coalitions do not have to and in fact rarely do encompass whole 
classes. Often labor market “insiders” (e.g., skilled workers employed in large companies 
of export industries) enter coalitions with their particular employers and their asso-
ciational representatives, whereas labor market “outsiders” (the unemployed and low-
skilled) as well as small firms in the domestic crafts sector tend to be left out of these co-
alitions (Hassel 2007; Palier/Thelen 2010). The result of these developments is increas-
ing labor market stratification (or dualization) or, in the words of Iversen (2005: 257): 
“shielded deregulation,” which protects the relative position of “insiders” while “outsid-
ers” suffer disproportionately from atypical and short-term employment, precarious 
jobs, and low pay. Whether social democratic government parties are actively privileg-
ing the interests of insiders, as suggested by Rueda (2006, 2007), or not (Palier/Thelen 
2010: 121) is still an open question, which the present paper is an attempt to help clarify.
The application of cross-class coalition theories to the concrete subject of German vo-
cational training politics leads to different predictions than in the case of power re-
source theory. First of all, these theories would expect cross-class coalitions between 
unions and employers to be the dominant coalitional pattern. Second, major reforms 
would seem unlikely, either because both business and labor do not see the need for 
large-scale reforms since they are already quite satisfied with the performance of the 
system, or because the respective “outsiders” on the periphery of the cross-class coali-
tions (small firms in the case of business, labor market outsiders in the case of labor) 
are not powerful enough to make their voices heard. Also, even if one side wishes to see 
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major reforms (as did the unions, for example, in the beginning of the 1980s), the other 
side has enough veto power to block these reform attempts, in particular if supported 
by state actors. This was essentially the situation in the 1980s, when unions (and Social 
Democrats in the opposition) were still advocating major reforms, but business and 
the new conservative government blocked large-scale legislative reforms and promoted 
cross-class compromise on the meso level instead.
The politics of institutional change in German vocational training during the reign of 
the SPD–Green coalition can be regarded as a “crucial” case study for the cross-class 
coalition perspective, just as it can for power resource theory. With Germany occupy-
ing a prominent place as a typical coordinated market economy and with vocational 
training supposedly the most important institutional sphere at the core of this type of 
economy, it is “most likely” that cross-class coalitions will continue to play a key role in 
the politics of training reform.
3 The politics of dualization in the German vocational training system
Figure 1 above documents the increasing pressures of dualization in the German train-
ing market. The emerging gap between the supply and demand of training slots is most 
likely the result of structural changes in the economy, the aftermath of German reunifi-
cation, and changes in the patterns of educational attainment and participation. For the 
purpose of the present paper, however, the crucial question is how political decision-
makers react to this problem and how economic actors such as unions and employ-
ers’ associations (try to) influence the government’s reaction. Although the German 
vocational training system features very prominently in the literature, there are very 
few studies published in English (Culpepper/Thelen 2008; Thelen 2004, 2007; Thelen/
Busemeyer 2008, 2011; Trampusch 2009, 2010) that have analyzed the political pro-
cesses behind recent reforms. The following section aims to help fill this research gap 
by employing the method of process tracing (Hall 2006) in three “within-case studies” 
of recent reforms (or reform attempts) in the German vocational training system. For 
brevity’s sake, I draw heavily here on the findings of a longer research project studying 
the politics of vocational training in Germany, published in German (Busemeyer 2009), 
which includes the insights of semi-structured interviews with more than 25 represen-
tatives of associations and political stakeholders, conducted between 2007 and 2008.
The three cases that will be studied in the following are the introduction of two-year 
apprenticeships, the failed attempt to establish a training levy, and the reform of the 
Federal Law on Vocational Education and Training. All three instances happened dur-
ing the recent period (2003 to 2005) when a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens 
was in government. There are two reasons this time frame was selected: first, there was 
a lot of reform activity during this time, reflecting the high level of problem pressure 
(lack of training slots) as well as the general political climate in the wake of the “Agenda 
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2010” reforms. From a pragmatic perspective, the cases selected were simply those in-
stances in vocational training politics that generated a sizable amount of public atten-
tion. Second, the various flavors of insider-outsider theories outlined above expect gov-
ernment participation by social democrats to be associated with dualization, although 
the literature does not provide a lot of evidence on the exact causal mechanisms and 
political dynamics behind this claim. The three cases can therefore be regarded as “typi-
cal” or “representative” cases in the framework of Seawright and Gerring (2007). The 
main purpose of the case studies is to explore the causal mechanisms at work by ana-
lyzing the political coalitions. The selection of cases is therefore driven by the desire to 
maximize useful variation of the dimensions of theoretical interest (ibid.: 296): differ-
ences in the patterns of coalitions between political and economic actors. The guiding 
research questions for the case studies are: What are the political coalitions supporting 
and opposing reform? What are the interests of relevant political actors? What are the 
outcomes of the reform?
A related, but substantially different research question is to ask whether a given reform 
can actually be regarded as promoting dualization. It is important to distinguish be-
tween dualization by political choice and dualization by drift, that is whether policy-
makers actively promote dualization through policies or whether they fail to counteract 
the pressure towards dualization resulting from structural changes in the labor market. 
Another important distinction is between the actual impact of reforms or non-reforms 
on the one hand and the subjective assessment of these reforms by relevant actors on 
the other. Governments might pass reforms in the hope of preventing dualization while 
in fact promoting it. Although these are important questions, it needs to be emphasized 
that the main focus of this paper is on politics, not outcomes of reforms. Nevertheless, 
at the beginning of each case study I will provide some information on the likely impact 
of the reforms under discussion.
The reintroduction of two-year apprenticeships
Traditionally there was a strong differentiation between skilled and unskilled workers in 
the German vocational training system. All apprentices who successfully passed the ex-
amination at the end of their apprenticeship were certified as skilled workers. Almost all 
apprenticeships lasted for three or three and a half years. The proposal to reintroduce2 
shorter training courses would open up new access routes for youth with low skills 
backgrounds, who often failed to succeed in the ever more demanding regular training 
programs, resulting in high dropout rates (Gruber/Weber 2007). Also, the reorganiza-
tion of production processes in the electric and metal industry created new demand for 
2 Two-year apprenticeships had been more important in the 1960s and 1970s, but were later 
phased out because of union pressure, except for some specific occupations such as shop clerk 
(cp. Busemeyer 2009: 99–100).
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semi-skilled workers (Zeller 2007). Creating new shorter training courses could thus 
lead to an increase in the number of available training slots and improve labor market 
integration of un- or underemployed youths.
On the other hand, however, the introduction of two-year apprenticeships could also be 
seen as promoting the institutional stratification of the hitherto undifferentiated training 
system, creating a new distinction between fully skilled and semi-skilled vocational qual-
ifications and erecting new barriers to access to the full-scale, regular training programs, 
in particular if the traditional apprenticeships are to be replaced by the shorter ones. 
Reinstituting two-year apprenticeships could also have negative spillover effects into the 
realm of collective wage bargaining. Wage levels are often directly linked to vocational 
qualifications, so that creating a new semi-skilled level could promote wage dispersion.
These ambiguities cannot be fully resolved and they also depend on the actual impact 
of the reforms on the training system, which is still not entirely clear. The important 
question, from the perspective of this paper, is how the relevant actors perceived and 
evaluated the reform proposal.
Employers had been arguing for a greater differentiation of the system for a long time. 
Instead of being forced to train all apprentices for three years or longer, they lobbied 
for the introduction of shorter, theoretically less demanding apprenticeships in order 
to avoid “unnecessary” training investments (Busemeyer 2009: 120). Differentiating be-
tween different kinds of apprenticeships would also encourage a greater differentiation 
in collective wage agreements. As these agreements often linked pay groups to voca-
tional qualifications, they forced employers to pay equal wages to workers independent 
of their actual productivity or the skill content of their respective jobs. For exactly these 
reasons, the unions were (and are) against creating different kinds of apprenticeships 
(ibid.: 119). They fear that the creation of less demanding types of apprenticeships will 
promote the further fragmentation of collective wage agreements.
The government coalitions of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats in the 1980s 
and 1990s offered rhetorical support for the employers’ demands for more differentia-
tion within the system (ibid.: 119), but they did not act on it. This changed dramatically 
in 2003, when Wolfgang Clement (SPD), then Minister for Economic and Labor Affairs, 
decided to move forward with the introduction of two-year apprenticeships, supported 
by the employers (Busemeyer 2009: 161, 189).
The support for the new two-year apprenticeships was not universal across business 
sectors, however. Large employers in the electrical and car industries were most sup-
portive, because they faced new demands for more specialized kinds of apprenticeships 
on the semi-skilled level below the level of the traditional skilled worker (Bellaire et al. 
2006; Lacher 2007; Zeller 2007). In contrast, firms in the crafts sector were quite critical. 
These firms’ primary motivation to hire apprentices is not to secure the future supply of 
skilled workers, but to get access to a cheap source of semi-skilled labor (Mohrenweiser/
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Backes-Gellner 2008). Because the productivity of apprentices increases during the lat-
ter stages of their training, these firms recoup a significant part of their training costs 
in the final third year and hence are less supportive of shorter apprenticeships. Fur-
thermore, socialization into local and/or occupational communities is very important 
for crafts firms, but usually takes longer than two years. Faced with high dropout rates 
of apprentices unable to meet the ever-rising demands of regular training courses, the 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag, 
DIHK) chose to compromise by demanding more flexibility in setting the length of ap-
prenticeship training for individual firms (DIHK 1999).
In contrast to employers, unions were strongly opposed to the new kind of less de-
manding apprenticeships. Unions feared this would promote training according to 
short-term needs and further weaken the commitment of firms to the apprenticeship 
system (DGB 2006: 52). They bitterly criticized the “needless” break with the tradition 
of the consensus principle (ibid.: 52), but to no avail. Another worry among the unions 
was that the introduction of a new kind of less demanding apprenticeship would cre-
ate negative spillover effects on collective wage agreements, fragmenting them further 
(Busemeyer 2009: 185–186; Thelen/Busemeyer 2011). Works councils at the firm level, 
however, were less critical of two-year apprenticeships when faced with the alternative 
of hiring no apprentices. They were more willing to compromise with their respective 
employers in exchange for the creation of new two-year apprenticeship slots, whereas 
union leadership at the industry level remained adamantly opposed for political rea-
sons (Busemeyer 2009: 190).
Because new or updated occupational profiles for recognized apprenticeships are for-
mally ministerial decrees, the minister could act against the opposition of the unions. 
The repositioning of the government was therefore crucial for moving forward with 
the reform. The traditional role of the German federal government had been that of a 
“neutral broker” in the background (Hilbert et al. 1990: 52), forcing and facilitating the 
compromise between the social partners. Now, it intervened much more actively and 
also broke with the traditional consensus principle. Moreover, the social democratic 
government, in the person of Wolfgang Clement, was acting against the unions, the So-
cial Democrats’ natural allies. Hence the reform was not being promoted by an insider-
oriented cross-class coalition, but by a reform coalition of segments of business and 
government, against the opposition of the unions and, in part, the crafts sector. It needs 
to be emphasized, however, that there was also conflict between the traditional left wing 
of the SPD in the parliamentary fraction and the reformist, business-friendly wing as 
represented by Clement. This cleavage is most important in the case of the training levy, 
as is discussed in the next subsection.
Why, then, did the government decide to break with the consensus principle? As said 
above, the social democratic government cared more about solving the persistent prob-
lem of a lack of training slots than its predecessor. By catering to the demands of em-
ployers, the government hoped to revitalize the firms’ commitment to apprenticeship 
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training. A study commissioned by the government (Vogler-Ludwig et al. 2003) came to 
the conclusion that the introduction of less demanding types of apprenticeships would 
lead to the creation of a significant number of additional training slots, in particular for 
young persons with low skills, who already had a hard time getting access to training.
The crucial takeaway from this case study is that, in terms of political coalitions, we can 
observe multiple cleavages in addition to the traditional left-right cleavage that have 
led to complex coalitional patterns. A first cleavage runs between large export-oriented 
employers and small, medium-sized firms in the domestic crafts sector. A second cleav-
age pits local works councils against trade unions at the industry level, although this 
cleavage is less salient than the first one. A third cleavage can be observed within the 
government coalition in the form of conflicts between traditionalists on the left and 
reformists on the right, although these conflicts are more relevant in the case of the 
training levy as is discussed below.
The failed attempt to introduce a training levy
Not long after the reintroduction of two-year apprenticeships, the government started a 
new attempt to solve the crisis on the apprenticeship market. In the fall of 2003, the par-
liamentary group of the Social Democrats presented a policy paper that argued in favor 
of introducing a training levy (SPD 2003). The revenues of this levy were to be used to 
subsidize firm-based apprenticeship training. The size of the levy would be computed 
for each firm separately, taking into account the costs of training and the individual 
firm’s past and present commitment. The goal was to devise a policy instrument that 
would hurt most the firms that did not participate in training, while not alienating 
those that stayed committed to the system.
The policy instrument of collecting a levy from non-training firms to cross-subsidize 
training is well established in other countries such as Denmark. Although such a levy 
had been a long-lasting demand of the German left, it needs to be emphasized that the 
SPD had always tended to regard the levy as mostly a useful political tool to encourage 
the voluntary participation of firms in training. The renewed interest in the training 
levy should therefore primarily be regarded as a political signal from the left wing of the 
government coalition that more pressure should be put on employers to increase the 
number of available training slots. In contrast to previous proposals put forward dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, however, this proposal came very close to being implemented 
despite the administrative complexities.
It is hard to assess the likely impact of a training levy on the apprenticeship market. In 
a survey conducted by the employer-friendly Cologne Institute for Economic Research 
(IW), only nine percent of firms said they would offer fewer training slots after the in-
troduction of the law (Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 April 2004: 1). The revenues 
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from the training levy could have been used to subsidize training in small firms and 
out-of-firm training centers. The overall impact might therefore have been positive, as 
the Danish example suggests (Nelson 2011). In any case, the introduction of the levy 
would have put additional pressure on firms to provide more training slots, so its even-
tual failure and replacement by the weaker “training pact” (see below) can be interpreted 
as a failed reform to counteract dualization.
The training levy was a controversial subject within the SPD leadership (see for the fol-
lowing Busemeyer 2009: 151–157). Wolfgang Clement, a representative of the reformist, 
business-friendly wing, was adamantly opposed. Chancellor Schröder remained am-
bivalent, but supported the project to appeal to the left wing of the party as a compensa-
tion for the “Agenda 2010” reforms. Franz Müntefering, who was scheduled to take over 
the party leadership from Schröder soon, supported the levy and wanted to use it to 
establish himself as the new party leader. Several influential Länder minister-presidents 
of the SPD opposed the training levy, threatening to use their veto power in the upper 
parliamentary chamber.
The employers’ associations, in coalition with the Christian Democratic and the Free 
Democrats’ party, were strongly opposed to the training levy. They feared that the state 
would intrude into the autonomy that firms enjoyed in the area of apprenticeship train-
ing (KWB 2003). In contrast to the case of two-year apprenticeships, there was no cleav-
age between the different segments of business.
Surprisingly, unions did not support the project wholeheartedly either, although the in-
troduction of a training levy had been a long-held demand of the unions (Busemeyer 
2009: 154). Left-leaning unions such as the powerful IG Metall, as well as the Confed-
eration of German Trade Unions (DGB), supported the project. The IG BCE (chemical 
workers), a more centrist union, opposed it. The IG BAU, representing workers from the 
construction industry, also opposed the levy, although the construction sector is the only 
sector where a training levy had already been in use since the 1980s (Streeck et al. 1987: 
26). Despite the fact that the new law gave priority to existing sectoral arrangements, the 
IG BAU feared that a general introduction of a training levy would endanger their suc-
cessful sectoral model.
Faced with strong opposition from within the government coalition, the unions, and 
the employers’ associations, the government decided to drop the training levy bill in the 
spring of 2004. Instead, it entered a “training pact” with employers (and without the 
unions). In this pact, which was renewed in 2007, the employers agreed to create 30,000 
new apprenticeship slots every year (Ausbildungspakt 2004). Employers also commit-
ted to providing 25,000 firm-based internships per year to ease the transition into regu-
lar apprenticeship training. These internships would be subsidized by the state.
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The government and employers celebrated the pact as a success. From the perspective 
of the government, the threat of the more intrusive training levy had revitalized the 
employers’ commitment to apprenticeship training. The government was happy to go 
along with the less intrusive and more corporatist training pact instead of being forced 
to push forward with the unpopular levy. Employers of course preferred this alternative 
too. Unions were critical of the pact, but as has already been noted above, they could not 
bring themselves to support the training levy wholeheartedly.
How effective is the pact in solving the crisis on the apprenticeship training market, and 
does it promote or counteract dualization? On the one hand, the newly created instru-
ment of special firm-based internships has become very popular in a short time. Firms 
have offered more internship slots than was envisaged in the pact. Research shows that 
these internships are more effective than other instruments of the transition system 
(GIB 2006). The number of new apprenticeships exceeds the obligations of the pact. On 
the other hand, however, these new apprenticeships are not necessarily additional train-
ing slots, because other firms might cease to offer training. Therefore, the creation of 
new apprenticeships can easily accompany a reduction in the total number of available 
training slots (see Figure 1). Most importantly, the pact does not entail any sanction-
ing mechanism. It is a political pact between business associations and the government, 
which of course does not directly bind individual firms.
What are the coalitional dynamics in the case of the training levy? At first, it seemed as 
if the traditional cleavage between a reform coalition of unions and the Social Demo-
crats on the one hand and business and the Christian Democrats on the other would 
be revitalized. These were the political coalitions in the 1970s, when the introduction 
of a training levy had been discussed for the first time. During the process, however, a 
new coalitional dynamic set in, which largely reflected the fundamental conflict be-
tween “traditional” and “modernizing” forces within the Social Democratic party and 
trade unions at large. The reformist wing of the Social Democrats opposed the levy 
and pushed for the quasi-corporatist training pact with business instead. Again, unions 
were not part of this coalition, although it seems as if the moderate unions such as 
the IG BCE would also have preferred the pact to the unpopular training levy. The 
left-leaning unions, which supported the levy, were entirely outside of the coalition. 
Interestingly, the centrist IG BCE and the left-leaning IG Metall found themselves on 
different sides in this conflict, although both of them can be regarded as the most likely 
cases of unions representing the interests of insider workers from large businesses in the 
export-oriented sectors of the economy.
In sum, the case of the training levy shows that the coalitional dynamics in the politics 
of dualization are complex. This time, the rift between promoters and opponents of du-
alization went right through the traditional coalition of Social Democrats and unions. 
It seems that here general political orientation (left or centrist, traditional or modern) 
was more important than insider or outsider status. In the end, employers’ threats to 
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withdraw from offering apprenticeships were most effective in priming the government 
to support a quasi-corporatist training pact with few strings attached instead of push-
ing through the unpopular training levy.
The reform of the Vocational Education and Training Act
Despite the bitter conflict over the training levy, the reform of the Federal Vocational 
Education and Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz – BBiG) passed in parliament with 
broad support in 2005. This case shows that the coalitions behind reforms or reform 
proposals can change quite suddenly and differ significantly depending on the concrete 
issue at hand. The case study of the reform of the BBiG also adds to the previous case 
studies by showing that insider-oriented cross-class coalitions can become relevant.
The BBiG provides a regulatory and institutional framework for the dual apprentice-
ship system. This framework is rather loose, because, as explained above, the content of 
training for individual occupations is stipulated in the form of ministerial decrees and 
firms offer apprenticeship training on a voluntary basis. Changing the policies of the 
BBiG therefore has only a limited impact on the actual transformation of the system. 
What is more, vocational training politics is a policy field with a large number of veto 
players. In addition to the federal government, unions and employers’ associations, the 
Länder governments have a seat at the table, because they are responsible for the school-
based portions of dual training. Therefore, although it was the most significant reform 
in vocational training since the early 1980s, the reform of the BBiG in 2005 was widely 
regarded as an incremental step rather than a radical policy reform (Greinert 2005).
In spite of this, the reformed BBiG contained a number of important changes. For ex-
ample, the law aimed to improve the link between the various measures of the transi-
tion system, active labor market policies, and regular training, as well as to open up the 
German system to international exchange. In the context of the present paper, the most 
important change was the decision to establish a school-based alternative track along-
side firm-based training. School-based vocational education and training in Germany 
has traditionally been focused on professions in the health and social sectors (and dom-
inated by young women). There was no occupational or professional overlap between 
the dual training system and school-based vocational education and training (VET), 
because policy-makers and stakeholders wanted to avoid a direct competition between 
school-based and firm-based training. The 2005 reform changed this situation. In order 
to deal with the structural crisis in the market for apprenticeships, the law envisaged 
the establishment of a school-based alternative track to regular dual training by admit-
ting students of vocational schools to the final exams administered by the Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce. Apprentices from firm-based and school-based training 
schemes alike would thus end up with the same vocational qualification in the end.
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The establishment of a school-based alternative track to regular dual training clearly 
benefits educational outsiders. A similar reform was enacted in Denmark in the early 
1990s, and as a consequence of this Denmark now fares better than Germany in mitigat-
ing youth unemployment and integrating educational outsiders (Martin/Knudsen 2010; 
Nelson 2011). In Germany, those captured in the “holding patterns” of the transition 
system cannot acquire vocational qualifications with any real labor market recognition. 
In contrast, students in the envisaged school-based VET track would end up with the 
same vocational degree as regular apprentices, although the latter would probably still 
have an easier time moving from training to employment. As a corollary to the im-
provement of the position of education outsiders, the relative position of the current 
“insiders” would deteriorate. This is most evident when looking at the policy positions 
of relevant stakeholders: the state, employers and unions.
The state’s policy position was determined when the Christian Democrats sided with the 
government coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in supporting the bill. Although 
the law contained the previously mentioned proposal to establish a school-based al-
ternative track, the accompanying statement by the parliamentary groups proclaimed 
that the purpose of the law was to “stop the trend of strengthening the role of the state 
[Verstaatlichung] in vocational training” (Fraktionen 2004: 3; translation by the author). 
This paradoxical statement shows that policy-makers were not aiming for a full-scale 
transformation of the system along Danish lines. Instead, the establishment of a school-
based track was supposed to be a temporary measure to ease the pressure on the market 
for apprenticeships, and the relevant provision in the law contained a sunset clause: it 
was scheduled to run out in 2011.
Employers were openly opposed to establishing the school-based alternative track. They 
feared it would strengthen the role of vocational schools and the state in general in vo-
cational training and enhance the competition between school-based and firm-based 
training schemes, which would eventually have a negative impact on the autonomy 
of training firms and their willingness to participate in apprenticeship training (Esser 
2006). In contrast to their behavior in the previously discussed cases, here most unions 
sided with the employers in their opposition against the school-based alternative track 
(DGB 2004: 6). From the unions’ perspective, dual training was superior to school-
based VET in integrating young people into the labor market (DGB 2003: 2; IG BCE 
2007: 37–38). Only the GEW (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft) – the teachers’ 
union – supported the expansion of school-based training (Kreft 2006: 259).
Unions and employers’ associations also worked together to slow down the implemen-
tation of the school-based training provision. During the decision-making process, 
unions and employers successfully demanded that they be strongly involved in decid-
ing which school-based training schemes would be accredited (DGB 2005: 6; Kremer 
2006: 15). School-based VET falls into the domain of the German Länder, or federal 
states, and decisions on it must therefore be made separately for each Land, which 
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ampli fies the veto power of the social partners. Because the school provision is set to 
run out in 2011, it is highly unlikely that it will lead to a systematic transformation that 
would establish a viable school-based track.
In sum, the case of the reform of the BBiG shows that insider-oriented cross-class coali-
tions are also an important element in the politics of dualization. A coalition between 
the majority of unions and employers’ associations has effectively blocked the imple-
mentation of a policy reform that would have benefited educational outsiders. State ac-
tors of various political stripes, however, have implicitly supported this coalition. They 
only showed half-hearted support for the establishment of a school-based alternative 
track in the first place, signaling early on that a full-scale transformation of the system 
was not intended.
4 Discussion
This section summarizes and generalizes the insights of the case studies in order to 
compare the case-study evidence to the predictions of the two conventional theories 
on policy and institutional change in contemporary political economies, as they were 
depicted in the second section of this paper. At first glance, both theoretical perspec-
tives fail to fully explain the developments observed in the case studies, although the 
case of vocational training in Germany can be regarded as a “most likely” case for both 
theories. The traditional political pattern of left vs. right cannot be observed in most 
cases. Cross-class coalitions prevail, but if we expand on the insights of the dualization 
literature we find different varieties of cross-class coalitions. In terms of outcomes, we 
see neither stability (as could be expected from the varieties of capitalism perspective) 
nor major reform (as implied in the power resource framework). Instead, we notice a 
pattern of incremental, transformative change (see Busemeyer 2009; Thelen/Busemeyer 
2008, 2011; Trampusch 2008, 2009, 2010 for details).
The following section therefore seeks to develop new theoretical perspectives on the 
role of government parties and economic actors in the politics of dualization. I struc-
ture the discussion around four general topics: first, the role of government parties in 
the politics of institutional change; second, coalitional patterns in the politics of train-
ing reform; third, the role of business; and fourth, the eventual outcome of the reform 
period and what it means with regard to dualization.
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The role of government parties in the politics of institutional change
Large-scale policy change is unlikely in the German political system in general, because 
the system is characterized by a high number of institutional and partisan veto players 
(Schmidt 2001). This statement is particularly true in the case of vocational training 
policy, because here the federalist and the corporatist decision-making arenas intersect. 
The Länder are responsible for the school-based part of dual training, whereas the feder-
al government, negotiating with the corporatist actors, is responsible for the firm-based 
part (Busemeyer 2009: 78–79). The regulatory framework of firm-based vocational 
training in the form of the BBiG is meant to be loose in order to encourage the vol-
untary participation of firms in apprenticeship training. This limits the government’s 
ability to instigate institutional change by means of changing the policy framework of 
dual training: first of all, multiple veto players with high stakes in the system will want 
to and be able to prevent large-scale change. Second, the real effect of policy changes on 
the institutions of the vocational training framework is less direct and immediate than 
it is in the case of highly centralized and statist education and training systems.
In spite of this, political parties in government can influence the direction and extent of 
change by manipulating the politics of institutional change (Pierson 2005: 37–39). In this 
process policy makers act as institutional gardeners 3 rather than institutional entrepre-
neurs. But even though “parchment” rules (Hall/Thelen 2009: 18) – formalized policies 
and institutional regulations – form the backbone of the kind of socioeconomic institu-
tions that are studied here, institutions should be conceived as living entities. The actual 
implementation of these rules and the real effects they have on the behavior of actors 
depends very much on the institutional ecology that emerges and supports the formal 
backbone. Governmental actors cannot be institutional entrepreneurs in the same sense 
that firms or other economic actors are, because unlike these non-state actors, they wield 
the legitimate power of collective decision-making (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995), even if the 
actual leeway for using this power may be limited in specific cases by political institutions.
Policy-makers as institutional gardeners may be (partly) aware of the importance of 
the institutional ecology of socioeconomic institutions and voluntarily limit the extent 
to which they wield the “hedge trimmers.” This mechanism can be observed at various 
points in time in the recent history of vocational training in Germany. In the mid-1970s, 
for example, the social-liberal government refrained from implementing far-reaching 
reforms that would have severely constrained the autonomy of firms in firm-based 
training, because they faced what in their view were credible threats by business to 
withdraw from firm-based apprenticeship training altogether.
As institutional gardeners, state actors and government parties have a privileged posi-
tion, particularly in corporatist decision-making arenas (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 
1997: ch. 9). Since they have the ultimate legitimate responsibility for policy-making, 
3 This idea is very much inspired by discussions I had with Wolfgang Streeck.
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they can identify priorities and instigate change by launching reform processes (agenda-
setting); the problem of a structural lack of training slots was indeed set on the agenda 
more forcefully when the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens came into power 
in 1998. Perhaps more important than their agenda-setting function, however, is how 
state actors define their role within corporatist decision-making arenas. In corporatist 
settings like the German training system, a significant share of public obligations is del-
egated to private actors. Because government actors are the ultimate arbiters, however, 
they can choose to reconfigure the relationship between state actors and social part-
ners, such as how much of these public obligations they delegate to corporatist actors. 
The Christian Democratic governments of the 1980s and 1990s, for example, took a 
very reluctant approach, granting corporatist actors plenty of leeway on training reform 
despite the increasing need to modernize apprenticeship training. The SPD-Green gov-
ernment, in contrast, intervened much more actively.
Another way state actors shape corporatist politics is to grant privileged access to one 
coalition of actors or another, thereby modifying the political conditions for institu-
tional change. The classic configurations can be found in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
unions joined Social Democrats in a reform coalition and business representatives 
sided with the Christian Democrats to defend the autonomy of firms. The case studies 
on the recent history of vocational training politics show that the “classic” configura-
tions are by no means the only ones possible. It should be emphasized, however, that 
political parties remain partisan actors in their manipulation of the politics of institu-
tional change, in that their selective granting or denying of access to policy-making is of 
course motivated by their strategic desire to cater to their political constituencies.
Coalitional patterns in the politics of training reform
The case studies have shown that coalitional patterns in the politics of training reform 
in Germany are complex and characterized by multiple, cross-cutting, and intersecting 
cleavages, which can be activated or not depending very much on the policy in question. 
Indeed, the traditional left-right pattern (business vs. labor) depicted in classical power 
resource theory can hardly be found, which stands in contrast to the 1970s, when this 
pattern was clearly dominant (Busemeyer 2009: 79–96).
Theoretical approaches in the tradition of the varieties of capitalism approach that em-
phasize the importance of cross-class coalitions are better suited to explain the observed 
developments. However, the case studies have shown that there are different kinds of 
cross-class coalitions, two general kinds of which we can identify.
The first of these is a “conservative” cross-class coalition between unions and employers, 
which comes closest to the kind of insider-oriented cross-class coalitions prominent in 
the dualization literature (Hassel 2007; Palier/Thelen 2010). This type of coalition was 
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very prominent in the case of the reform of the BBiG. In this case, unions and employ-
ers jointly opposed attempts to open up access for students in vocational schools to 
vocational training exams in the Chambers, because they feared a direct competition 
between firm-based and school-based vocational education and a devaluation of the 
training certificate. In contrast to the other cases, no strong cleavages could be observed 
within the respective camps of business and labor, with the exception of the teachers’ 
union (GEW), which favored expanding school-based vocational education. The cross-
class coalition also included elements of the political parties. The law was passed with 
the broad support of the government coalition and some of the opposition party (the 
CDU/CSU). Although the law contained the provision to establish a school-based alter-
native track, the accompanying text signaled skepticism amongst the sponsoring parties 
with regard to expanding the role of the state. The specifics of the law then allowed the 
social partners to effectively block the actual implementation of this provision. The 
conservative cross-class coalition thus aims to maintain the status quo, i.e., the privilege 
of firm-based training over alternatives such as school-based vocational education.
A second kind of cross-class coalition can be called the “segmentalist” coalition (see 
also Thelen/Busemeyer 2008, 2011; Trampusch 2008, 2009, 2010). In contrast to the 
conservative coalition, this kind of cross-class coalition aims for (cautious) reform and 
transformation of the system by making it more flexible and better suited to the needs 
of training firms, e.g., by reintroducing two-year apprenticeships, increasing the leeway 
for individual firms in implementing training regulations and administering exams, and 
maintaining the autonomy of firms in providing and financing training. The segmental-
ist coalition in the case study was made up of government actors (mainly, but not solely, 
from the reformist wing of the Social Democratic party) and business representatives. 
Thus it is a form of cross-class coalition, although it is biased in favor of the interests of 
business. The interests of large, export-oriented businesses featured more prominently 
in this coalition, with the BDA (Confederation of German Employer Organizations) 
and the other associations that represent the interests of the export industry (such as 
Gesamtmetall, the employers in the metalworking industry, or the ZVEI, the employers 
in the electronics industry) playing a leading role. Small firms, in particular those in the 
crafts sector and represented by the ZDH, tended to be closer to the unions in their de-
fense of the traditional system against a more flexibilized, segmentalist variety (Thelen/
Busemeyer 2011). The Chambers’ chief organization (DIHK) tried to mediate between 
the diverging interests within the business community. The segmentalist coalition was 
pitted against a coalition of “traditionalists,” consisting of labor unions (with IG Metall 
and ver.di, the service union, as well as the DGB leading the field) and, to some extent, 
the left wing of the Social Democratic party, although the latter remained politically 
ineffective during the time period studied. This coalitional pattern was most obvious in 
the cases of the training levy and the two-year apprenticeships.
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The role of business in training reform
The common element between the three within-case studies and the associated coali-
tional patterns is that the interests representing medium-sized and large businesses in 
the export economy are part of the dominant political coalition. This observation fits 
very well with the general focus of the German political economy on export industries 
(Hassel 2007; Thelen/Wijnbergen 2003). The puzzle that requires explanation is why 
unions (in the case of the “conservative” cross-class coalition) and a social democratic 
government (in the case of the “segmentalist” pattern) decided to side with business, 
often ending up pitted against their natural allies.
My argument is that, in different coalitions and by different means, both social demo-
crats in government and unions try to maintain the business sector’s commitment to 
the apprenticeship system. Certainly firms also offer apprenticeship opportunities be-
cause they benefit from investments in vocational training (Hassel 2007). However, the 
fact that firms also benefit from arrangements of collective skill formation (Busemeyer/
Trampusch 2011) does not in itself ensure their continued political sustainability, be-
cause individual firms always have an incentive to break out of existing institutions, 
even though such institutions might be beneficial to employers as a whole in the long 
term (Streeck 2009; see also Streeck 1992). Also, while employers are unwilling to abol-
ish the vocational training system altogether, they do have an interest in “optimizing” 
the system’s institutional setup. Therefore business actors, while maintaining their gen-
eral commitment to apprenticeship training, are interested in transforming the insti-
tutional framework in such a way as to bring the training system closer in line with 
the individual needs of the training firms (Hassel 2007). This can be interpreted as an 
attempt to renegotiate the institutional settlement of the neocorporatist compromise. 
The goal is not to abolish the institutional framework altogether, but to get rid of those 
institutional impositions that do not provide economic benefits.
The paradoxical finding from the case studies (see also Thelen/Busemeyer 2008, 2011; 
Trampusch 2008, 2009, 2010) is that the influence of business actors, in particular the 
large firms in the export-oriented core of the economy, is growing while the problems 
in the training market are becoming increasingly urgent. From the perspective of power 
resource theory and based on the experience of the 1970s, unions and the SPD-Green 
coalition could have been expected to enter into a reform coalition against business to 
initiate large-scale reforms. But the opposite happened: the associational representa-
tives of the export economy have become the formateurs of a variety of cross-class 
coalitions, siding with unions in defending the superiority of firm-based training in the 
case of the BBiG reform and siding with the government against the unions in order to 
initiate an incremental flexibilization of the system.
One part of the explanation for these coalition patterns has to do with the specific 
institutional setup of the German vocational training system, which is based on the 
principle of voluntary participation by individual firms. The number of available train-
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ing slots cannot be set by government actors, as in statist or school-based education 
systems. Instead, policy-makers depend on the willingness of firms to offer a sufficient 
number of training slots and they try to provide the right incentives to enhance this 
willingness. Unions cannot force firms to offer training either. Even works councils can-
not force their employers to hire apprentices; they can only make it harder for employ-
ers to fire workers already employed in the firm.
The state and the unions thus have a fundamental dependence on the cooperation of 
business in one concrete case: the provision of a sufficient number of training slots. This 
dependence is not structural, but politically constructed.4 It is directly related to the spe-
cific “institutionalization of the class conflict” (Rothstein 1987), in the form of the neo-
corporatist institutions that emerged in the wake of the political struggles over the reform 
of vocational training in the 1970s, when transforming the firm-oriented training system 
into a more statist variety reminiscent of Scandinavian education systems had been a real 
option. The important outcome of these struggles was the recognition of the principle 
of firms’ autonomy in training decisions as an important pillar of the emerging neocor-
poratist compromise. Unions accepted the autonomy for firms that came out of the neo-
corporatist deal as a “second best” outcome, after the ambitious reforms of the 1970s had 
failed and a change in government from the Social Democrats to the Christian Democrats 
in 1982 made further large-scale reforms unlikely. In contrast to other countries such as 
Switzerland and Japan, where the role of unions in vocational training was already mar-
ginalized, German unions were still powerful enough to exercise considerable veto power 
at the industrial and the firm level. Unions were powerful enough to gain full integration 
into the corporatist institutional framework that was set up to make regular updates and 
reforms to the set of ordinances that regulated the specific content of vocational training 
(Ausbildungsordnungen). The government promoted and supported cross-class compro-
mise. State actors remained “neutral brokers” in the background, facilitating and support-
ing the emergence of consensual solutions (Streeck et al. 1987; Hilbert et al. 1990: 52).
The neocorporatist compromise of the early 1980s provided concrete benefits for 
all concerned. However, these positive effects as such were not sufficient to ensure 
the long-term political sustainability of the system. As is argued by Hall and Thelen 
(2009: 11), “the institutions and practices of capitalist political economies can rarely be 
sustained over time without the active support of at least some powerful segments of 
capital.” Socioeconomic institutions such as training regimes are not “self-reinforcing” 
(Greif/Laitin 2004). Instead, they reflect the distribution of power between business, 
labor, and the state, as well as between different fractions of capital. Changes in the 
balance of power are therefore likely to have an effect on institutions. Of course, this is 
4 Here, my argument differs from structuralist accounts such as Lindblom’s (1977). Lindblom 
claims that business has a structurally “privileged position” in capitalist and democratic economies, 
because it cannot be forced to invest and hire workers but must be induced to do so. My argument 
also emphasizes that governments try to induce firms to provide apprenticeship training. The 
crucial difference, however, is that the government’s dependence on the willingness of business to 
provide training is not structural or functional, but politically constructed (and thus reversible).
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not a simple and smooth transition mechanism. Because of path dependencies, institu-
tions may continue to grant veto power to actors whose power has deteriorated since 
the time the institutional compromise was decided upon. Those actors whose power 
position has improved since then strive to renegotiate the terms of the deal.
In the case of vocational training (and industrial relations more generally), the last de-
cades have witnessed a shift in the balance of power from labor to capital with im-
portant consequences for the transformation of training regimes. The rise in business 
power is often attributed to exogenous forces such as globalization, but it also has a 
collective, i.e., associational dimension that is often overlooked. Firms decide individu-
ally whether they want to participate in training, but they are embedded in a network 
of socioeconomic institutions, obligations, and employers’ associations. Employers’ as-
sociations, however, are less able to enforce their individual members’ compliance with 
collective concerns, such as the provision of a sufficient number of training slots, be-
cause the associations themselves are in a process of erosion. Firms cannot be forced to 
provide training – neither by unions, the state, nor employers’ associations – without 
this fundamentally challenging the corporatist deal at the core of the voluntarist system. 
When it comes to training, firms can resort to the exit option much more easily than in 
other institutional policy fields (such as labor-market or welfare-state policies). They 
do not have to move production to distant countries; they simply have to stop offering 
apprenticeship training (or threaten to do so). Paradoxically, the more firms drop out 
of the system, the more government actors will be willing to succumb to the demands 
of employers’ associations to keep the remaining firms in. Employers’ associations thus 
become more successful in lobbying for a transformation of the regulatory framework 
when their ability to enforce collective obligations erodes. In this sense, the organiza-
tional weakness of intermediary associations leads to political strength (Streeck 1992).
The relative increase of business power has contributed to a transformation of corpo-
ratism (Traxler 2004). The neocorporatist arrangements of the 1970s and 1980s have 
been largely understood as an attempt by labor and state actors to tame the power 
of business (Rothstein 1987). More and more, these arrangements are becoming in-
struments to incorporate elements of labor interests into new forms of “competitive 
corporatism” (Molina/Rhodes 2002), i.e., to mitigate the opposition of labor against 
deregulation and welfare state retrenchment. Indeed, new forms of corporatism have 
become “leaner” (Traxler 2004) and oriented more towards maintaining competitive-
ness than expanding the welfare state (Molina/Rhodes 2002). The crucial insight of 
my case studies, however, is that the balance of power between business, labor, and the 
state within corporatist arrangements can change over time. New forms of corporatism 
“without labor” (see Pempel/Tsunekawa 1979 for the well-known case of Japan) or with 
weak labor can be equally or, as argued by Crouch (1993: 44), even more sustainable 
than social democratic varieties of neocorporatism.
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If this depiction of the role of business, labor, and state actors is correct, then the insider-
oriented cross-class coalitions, tolerated and tacitly supported by the state, should be 
regarded as a reflection of the simple fact that the political sustainability of corporat-
ist compromises depends on the willingness of unions and the state to sacrifice some 
of their positions in order to maintain firms’ commitment to hold up the business 
part of the deal. Thus even in those cases where unions have been found to be part of 
insider-oriented cross-class alliances, this could simply reflect the choice of a “second 
best” strategy on the part of unions.
The rising power of business actors makes them more assertive in their attempts to get 
rid of social and political obligations imposed on them as part of the neocorporatist 
deal. The case studies have shown how business actors, supported by the government, 
aim to transform the regulatory framework of the vocational training system in order 
to bring it closer in line with the particularistic needs of firms who provide training. 
The governmental policy-makers involved have the goal (and hope) of increasing the 
willingness of firms to participate in apprenticeship, i.e., that they will hire more ap-
prentices. Herein lies the core of the politically constructed dependence of government 
on business: Business willingness to participate in training depends on the business-
friendly transformation of the regulatory framework.
The outcome: Dualization by drift
Coming back to Figure 1, it is clear that the situation in the training market improved 
somewhat after the reform period (2003–2005) studied in this paper. New entrants in the 
transition system declined, and the number of available training slots remained stable, 
but at a much lower level than in the 1990s. How much of this development may be due 
to exogenous forces, such as the economic upswing in 2006–2007, or a declining number 
of school-leavers on the one hand and the effect of government reforms on the other, is 
hard to say. Nevertheless, it can be said that the number of young people in the transition 
system remains significant. According to the latest figures, more than a third of all new 
entrants into the vocational sector ended up in the transition system in 2008, although 
the economy was doing very well (Autorengruppe BIBB/Bertelsmann Stiftung 2011: 7).
The real impact of reforms or missed reform opportunities on the training system is 
hard to assess, but it can be said that more ambitious reforms for large-scale institu-
tional change would have been a stronger antidote against dualization, e.g., establishing 
a levy-grant system whose revenues could have been used to sponsor out-of-firm train-
ing or to subsidize training in small firms, as well as to institutionalize a fully fledged 
school-based alternative track. These and other policies have been introduced in other 
countries, such as Austria and Denmark (Graf/Powell/Lassnigg 2011; Martin/Knudsen 
2010; Nelson 2011), and have proven to be quite successful in fighting youth unemploy-
ment and labor market stratification.
Busemeyer: Varieties of Cross-Class Coalitions in the Politics of Dualization 25
In Germany, by contrast, the outcome can best be described as dualization by drift. No 
relevant political stakeholder would openly promote dualization, but the alternating 
dominance of either the conservative or the segmentalist cross-class coalition has been 
effective in blocking the kind of large-scale policy and institutional change that would 
have been (and still is, by the way) necessary to effectively counter the ongoing trend 
towards dualization. The conservative cross-class coalition blocked attempts to institu-
tionalize fully fledged school-based alternatives that would probably have been more 
effective in countering the trend towards dualization.5 The segmentalist coalition did 
promote incremental reforms, but these reforms were primarily aimed at flexibilizing 
the system. Although the government hoped this reformation of the training system 
would boost employers’ willingness to increase the supply of training slots, this aspect 
was subordinated to the goal of “modernizing the system.” Thus, in the end, I concur 
with Palier and Thelen (2010: 126, 131), who argue that dualization should be regarded 
as an unintended consequence of enhanced (or maintained) cooperation in the form of 
cross-class coalitions. The new element this paper brings into the debate is to show that 
there are different varieties of cross-class coalitions, and that the political and institu-
tional dependence on the cooperation of business is the central causal mechanism that 
is driving the formation of these coalitions.
5 Conclusions and outlook
This paper has argued that cross-class coalitions are the dominant political force in the 
politics of reforming the German vocational training system. However, the case studies 
have shown that there are different varieties of cross-class coalitions, which I have called 
conservative and segmentalist cross-class coalitions. The somewhat unexpected occur-
rence of a social democratic government allying with business against an opposition 
made up of their natural allies – the unions – prompted a more thorough rethinking of 
the role of business in the politics of training reform. I have argued that this alliance can 
best be understood if one recognizes the fundamental dependence of policy-makers on 
the willingness and ability of firms to provide a sufficient number of training slots. This 
dependence is not structural, but stems from how the specific institutional setup of the 
German vocational training system is based on the principles of voluntarism and firm 
autonomy. The outcome of recent reforms is an incremental, but in the long term trans-
formative, change of the system towards a more flexible, firm-centered variety (Thelen/
Busemeyer 2008, 2011). This change, however, does not necessarily counter the trend 
towards dualization.
5 However, it needs to be emphasized that the commonly held view among unions is that firm-
based training is the best instrument against youth unemployment and performs much better 
than school-based alternatives (DGB 2004, 2006).
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What are the avenues for future research? The case studies have shown clearly that gov-
ernmental actors play a crucial role in promoting or counteracting dualization. But does 
it matter which party is in government? This paper could only partially address this issue, 
because I did not compare reform politics across different government periods. A pre-
liminary answer to the debate between Rueda (2006, 2007) and Palier and Thelen (2010) 
on the role of social democratic parties is that these parties do indeed play an ambigu-
ous role in the politics of dualization. The case studies have shown that social democrats 
do not openly promote dualization policies, but may side with insider-oriented cross-
class coalitions in defense of traditional institutional setups, which results in a process 
of dualization by drift. What is more, the case studies have also shown that social demo-
crats are willing to cooperate with business in reform coalitions against the interests of 
union insiders. The primary purpose of these reforms, however, was not necessarily to 
stop dualization but to modernize and flexibilize the system, although the government 
did hope for an increase in the supply of training slots as a positive side effect.
It still remains somewhat unclear whether conservative parties in government are pro-
moting full-scale deregulation instead of shielded deregulation, or are simply advocat-
ing no deregulation at all. Both seem possible: in the first case, conservative government 
parties would “spread the pain” more equally across different constituencies, although 
such policies would of course primarily benefit their core constituencies in the upper 
income classes. In the second case, conservative governments might simply be failing 
to push through unpopular retrenchment and liberalization reforms because they now 
face the joint opposition of unions and social democrats. This “Nixon goes to China” 
logic is why Ross (2000) has argued that social democratic governments are more likely 
to be “successful” in welfare state retrenchment than rightist governments. Although 
the case studies in this paper only deal with cases occurring while the Social Democrats 
and Greens were in power, a general assessment of the policies during the era of Chris-
tian Democratic governments (Busemeyer 2009: 106–147) provides tentative support 
for the “Nixon goes to China” thesis. Various conservative governments of the 1980s 
and 1990s had wanted to appeal to the interests of employers, e.g., by creating shorter, 
less demanding types of apprenticeship, but failed to do so. Thus the willingness of the 
reformist social democrats in government, in particular Wolfgang Clement, to cooper-
ate with business was crucial to promoting the incremental flexibilization and differen-
tiation of the system.
To what extent can the findings of this paper be generalized beyond the case of voca-
tional training? A crucial variable defining the power relationships between business, 
government and labor is the availability of exit options for business. In the case of vo-
cational training, the exit option is easily available, because firms can simply stop hiring 
apprentices; they do not have to move production to distant countries. Therefore the 
government is highly willing to provide incentives to businesses to keep them within 
the system. In other policy fields, of course, the exit option may not be as easily available 
as in the case of vocational training. But, undoubtedly, structural changes over the last 
decade such as globalization and Europeanization have made it much more available 
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than before. The basic mechanism identified in this paper for the field of vocational 
training should also be applicable in other policy areas. For example, the coalitional 
dynamics that Häusermann (2010) finds in the case of pension policy are very similar 
to the ones identified in this paper. Future research on the politics of dualization should 
therefore pay more attention to the role of business actors and variations in the forma-
tion of cross-class coalitions in particular.
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